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Faculty and Deans

Book Reviews
The Constitution Between Friends
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS PoLmCAL PROCESS. By Louis Fisher. t Princeton: Princeton Uuiversity Press,
1988. Pp. x, 306. $35.00 cloth, $12.95 paperback.t
Reviewed by Neal Devins*
I.

Introduction

In a recent survey, six out of ten respondents claimed that they view
the Supreme Court as the ultimate constitutional arbiter. 1 Newspaper
coverage of this survey simply noted that these six were "correct."2
Two years ago, then United States Attorney General Edwin Meese
sparked controversy by arguing that Supreme Court decisions are not
"binding on all persons and parts of government henceforth and forevermore. " 3 For New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis, this assertion
was an invitation to anarchy. 4
The reaction to the Meese speech and the reporting of the constitutional survey both reflect the view that Supreme Court interpretations
control the Constitution's application. This perception, however, is
overly parochial and ultimately shortsighted. Granted, disrespect for
Court interpretations by the elected branches and the states is destabilizing and therefore to be avoided. 5 But one cannot trace constitutional
decision making solely to the efforts of nine individuals working in isola-

t
t

Specialist, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress.
Hereinafter cited by page number only.
• Assistant Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary;
Research Fellow, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, College of William and Mary. The author would
like to thank Rod Smolla for commenting on a previous draft.
1. Wash. Post, Feb. 15, 1987, at Al3, col. 1.
2. Id.
3. Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REv. 979, 983 (1987). For a summation of
the controversy and a partial defense of Meese, see Levinson, Could Meese Be Right this Time?, 243
NATION 689 (1986).
4. Lewis, Law or Power?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1986, at A23, col. 1.
5. See Greenawalt, Constitutional Decisions and the Supreme Law, 58 U. CoLo. L. REV. 145,
146-49 (1987); Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723,
749-53 (1988).
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tion. Other parts of government both interpret the Constitution and influence the judiciary.
The above proposition is hardly novel. A long list of books and
articles speak to nonjudic:ial constitutional decision making. 6 A recent
and worthwhile addition to this list is Louis Fisher's Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process.

II. The Character of Three-Branch Interpretation
Fisher proposes to show that constitutional law "is a process in
which all three branches converge and interact ... [with] [i]mportant
contributions also com[ing] from the states and the general public." 7
Fisher succeeds admirably at this task, resting his case on hard evidence
that falls into at least thrt:e categories.
First, Fisher notes that numerous powers lodged in the elected
branches check judicial e:x egesis. These powers include the appointment
and confirmation of judges, 8 the regulation of federal court jurisdiction,9
and the allocation of judicial salaries and resources. 10 Second, Fisher
points out that the elected branches play a critical role in constitutional
interpretation. Arguments before the Court are frequently those of the
Solicitor General and congressional litigants. 11 More significantly, the
Court's use of threshold justiciability and political question barriers 12
often gives the elected branches sole responsibility for ensuring that their
own actions conform to constitutional norms. Finally, Fisher recognizes
that the judiciary engage~. in constitutional dialogue by encouraging the
elected branches to clarify judicial action through legislation or
regulation. 13
In that commentators have discussed these various phenomena elsewhere, 14 Fisher's book is not pathbreaking. What distinguishes this book
is its thoroughness and evenhandedness. Fisher means to illuminate the
current arrangement rather than argue the arrangement's propriety, success, or failure.
Fisher chronicles the: various elements of his proof with the meticu6. For recent books on the · ssue of nonjudicial interpretation, see generally S. BARBER, ON
WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS n984); C. JOHNSON & B. CANON, JUDICIAL POLIDCS: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT (1984); D. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER (1986).

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

P. 3.
See pp. 135-43.
See pp. 215-21.
See pp. 149-52.
See pp. 24-36.
See pp. 85-118.
See pp. 247-70.
Fisher identifies these works in his extensive list of suggested reading. Pp. 281-90.
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lousness of a scientist testing a hypothesis. For example, he divides his
chapter on threshold requirements into units on adverseness, advisory
opinions, standing, mootness, ripeness, and political questions. Each
unit makes the same point. "If the judiciary is unprepared or unwilling
to decide an issue, mootness [as well as standing, adverseness, and other
similar rules are] one avenue of escape." 15 "When the judiciary is ready
to decide an issue, 'mootness' [as well as standing, adverseness, and other
similar rules] will not stand in its way." 16 Furthermore, Fisher applies
the same methodology of comparing and contrasting case facts and holdings in each unit. He then distills the accumulated evidence into his central thesis: that threshold requirements "ration scarce judicial resources
.... Judges invoke [them] to promote the adversary system, preserve
public support, avoid conflicts with other branches of government, and
provide flexibility of action for the judiciary." 17
Although Fisher's methodology lacks drama, it is effective and efficient. He constantly reinforces his central thesis with mini-units packed
with salient information about three-branch interpretation. In addition
to his discussion of threshold requirements, Fisher's stockpile of topics
includes non-article III courts; judicial appointments, removal, and compensation; lobbying by elected officials and interest groups in the courts,
and lobbying by judges outside of the courts; the certiorari decision; the
removal of federal court jurisdiction; court packing; federal-state court
relations; the implementation of court orders; and court-invited constitutional interpretation by Congress. For those accustomed either to more
deliberate explication or to more leisurely discussion of a subject, the
book's never-ending flow of information operates like the Chinese water
torture. After a couple of chapters, you are ready to concede Fisher's
point. By book's end, you have long passed the point of capitulating. 1s
Despite being fact-heavy, Constitutional Dialogues is far from boring. Although occasionally bogged down by unnecessary detail, 19 the
book is chock full of anecdotes that add life to Fisher's explorations. The
15. P. 102.
16. P. 103.
17. P. 85.
18. An added virtue of this approach is that one ean use Fisher's book as a general reference.
Indeed, the book functions magnificently as a reference. The chapters are organized around discrete
subjects, and the index is complete and accessible. Moreover, the chapter units are well documented
and clearly written. Fisher also provides excellent bibliographic information.
19. For example, the book details such topics as the Court's caseload burden and bureaucratic
rules goveruing Supreme Court procedures. See generally pp. 162-99 (chapter on Supreme Court
decision making). The book also devotes a chapter to the evolution of judicial review, a concern only
tangentially related to constitutional dialogues. See pp. 44-84.
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author places decisions suc:h as Ex parte McCardle, 20 Buck v. Bell,21 and
the Steel Seizure Case 22 in their social contexts. He provides an historical backdrop to efforts by the Justices to lobby Congress,2 3 discusses examples of how politics plays a role in case assignments, 24 and charts the
rise of legislators' attempt8 to advance their policy arguments. 25 Indeed,
Fisher is remarkably adept at enlivening both well-known topics with
little-known facts and well-known subjects with little-known topics. 26
Fisher's use of case studies to substantiate the book's central arguments also invigorates Constitutional Dialogues. Standing out among
these tales are Fisher's descriptions of the legislative reactions to fourth
amendment case law and 1:he Supreme Court's rejection of the legislative
veto in INS v. Chadha.21
The Chadha discussion highlights the need for Supreme Court sensitivity to political realities. Characterizing the legislative veto as a "classic quid pro quo" betwe«~n legislature and executive,28 Fisher fmds it
predictable that the executive and legislative branches would breach and
circumvent the holding in Chadha. After describing some of the postChadha arrangements b~:tween agencies and their oversight committees,29 Fisher concludes that "[n]either branch wants the static model of
separated powers offered by the Court. The inevitable result is a record
of noncompliance, subtle ~~vasion, and a system oflawmak.ing that is now
more convoluted, cumbersome, and covert than before." 30
Fisher's discussion of fourth amendment issues exemplifies how
Congress and the Court can work in concert to develop constitutional
standards. 31 The Court has recognized explicitly that its fourth amend20. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1867) (discussed at pp. 218-19).
21. 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (discussed at p. 18).
22. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (discussed at pp. 28-29).
23. See pp. 122-23 (detailing :.etters sent in 1793 by Supreme Court Justices to Congress about
the physical hardships of ridipg ·circuit).
24. Seep. 175 (describing r~.ssignment of a Texas "white primary" case from Justice Frankfurter, a Vienna-born Jew, to Justtce Reed, a Kentucky Democrat).
25. See pp. 30-36.
26. The ability to bring forward new and useful information is Fisher's trademark. See generally L. FlSHER, CONSTITUUONAl CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT (1985)
(containing an historical overview of constitutional controversies involving Congress and the executive); L. FlSHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER (2d ed. 1987) (discussing the relationship between Congress and the executive in the context of recent events).
27. 462 u.s. 919 (1983).
28. P. 224. Under the legisla1:ive veto, agencies were able to act in the absence oflegislation and
Congress was able to disapprove of such action without sending legislation to the President.
29. Pp. 225-27; see also Not·~. Congressional Oversight Through Legislative Veto After INS v.
Chadha, 69 CoRNELL L. REV. 1244, 1262-66 (1984) (discussing the effect of Chadha on several
categories of existing legislative V•!to provisions).
30. P. 228.
31. See generally pp. 255-70.
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ment decisions "do[ ] not prevent or advise against legislative or executive efforts to establish nonconstitutional protections against possible
abuses of the search warrant procedure." 32 Consequently, Congress
passed legislation to prohibit the third-party searches of newspapers33
that the Court upheld in the Stanford Daily case. 34 Although describing
the evolution of this bill as an "intricate dance" between Congress and
the courts, Fisher concludes that "Congress performed the identical task
attempted by the Court-balancing the Fourth Amendment against
other interests-and reached a strikingly different conclusion." 35
The Congressional responses to Chadha and Stanford Daily both
demonstrate the critical role played by nonjudicial actors in defining the
Constitution. By combining studies such as these with other anecdotal
information, Fisher succeeds both in holding the reader's interest and in
amassing a large body of information revealing the political sensibilities
of the judiciary and the constitutional responsibilities of the elected
branches.
III.

The Consequences of Three-Branch Interpretation

Fisher's detail work is not extraneous to the debate over the appropriate role of the elected branches in constitutional interpretation. Because legislative and executive action influence constitutional decision
making, caution should guide those who support the abdication of interpretive responsibilities by the elected branches. Heat should be put onnot taken off-all parties engaging in constitutional dialogues. To do
otherwise would promote irresponsible constitutional interpretation.
Scholarship in this area generally focuses either on the institutional
competence of the branches or on the propriety of nonjudicial constitutional interpretation. 36 Commentators pay little attention to the more
32. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 567 (1978) (discussed at pp. 255-57).
33. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000aa, 2000aa-5 to -7, 2000aa-11 to -12 (1982)).
34. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 550-53.
35. P. 257.
36. See, e.g., J. AGRESfO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984)
(examining judicial review in light of history and constitutional theory and arguing that constitutional deliberation should not be the exclusive province of the courts); J. CHOPER, JuDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLmCAL PROCESS 169-380 (1980) (arguing that the political process
and separation of powers make judicial review inappropriate for certain constitutional issues);
Hickok, The Framers' Understanding of Constitutional Deliberation in Congress, 21 GA. L. REv.
217, 217 (1986) (arguing that framers intended Congressional deliberation on constitutional issues);
Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U.
CHI. L. REv. 366, 367 (1984) (proposing a comparative institutional analysis that the Supreme
Court could use to decide which branch of government should decide a particular constitutional
issue); Perspectives on the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decisions, 61 TUL. L. REv. 977-1095
(1987) (Attorney General Meese's speech and reactions from scholars); The Federalist Society Sixth
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mundane concerns of asse~:sing the quality of nonjudicial interpretations37 or offering proposal~: for improving dialogues between the three
branches. 38 ·Correlatively, seholars give little play to political considerations that may well influence judicial action.3 9 To be sure, there are exceptions. Paul Brest has recently written both about the consequences of
our faulty assumption "that only the Court is authorized to decide, or is
capable of deciding, constitutional questions" 40 and about Congress's
power-based on an evalua1ion of its performance-to oppose Court interpretations.41 Walter Murphy and others have prepared a casebook
that deals in large part with the question, "Who may authoritatively interpret the Constitution?"42 Overall, however, scholars consider the
Constitution to be the courts' possession.
Fisher's chronicling of three-branch interj>retation debunks this perception. Fisher's work, however, is not without its shortcomings. First,
if Fisher had used more extensive case studies, Constitutional Dialogues
might have offered a richer understanding of three-branch interpretation.
Second, Fisher pays insufficient attention to the quality of nonjudicial
interpretation and fails to offer sugges~ions for its improvement.
Detailed case studies provide the best device for understanding how
the elected branches and the states engage in constitutional dialogues
with the Supreme Court. They help to place judicial and nonjudicial
action in context by focusing attention on the nature of the dialogue between branches and levels of government. Constitutional Dialogues purposefully avoids this appmach. Fisher's concern is the reality, not the
operation, of three-branch interpretation. The author drives home this
Annual Symposium on Law and Public Policy, 73 CoRNELL L. REv. 281, 371-400 (1988) (panel on
the role of the legislative and executive branches in interpreting the Constitution).
37. But see Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and its Power to Counter Judicial
Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57, 82-101 (1986) (discussing examples of legislation and concluding that
Congress has no tradition of constitutional deliberation and no procedures for routinely reviewing
the constitutionality of legislation); Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63
N.C.L. REv. 707, 731-34 (1985) (reviewing legislation that Congress passed only after concluding,
with good reason, that it would be constitutional); Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and
Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C.L. REv. 587, 587 (1983) (discussing legislation and concluding that
Congress does not thoroughly review the constitutionality of legislation it passes).
38. Cf Devins, Bob Jones University v. United States: A Political Analysis, 1 J.L. & PoL. 403,
420 (1984) (interpreting the Bob Jones decision in light of related legislative and executive action).
39. Cf Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 585, 601 (1975) (failing to address "the practical problems that confront a legislator whose
constitutional obligations conflict with the political demands of his office").
40. Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 175, 175 (1986). In Brest's view,
·~udicial exclusivity" is problematic both because some issues never come before courts and because
courts-when they do consider constitutional issues-often defer to the legislature's judgment. I d.
at 181.
41. Brest, supra note 37, at 10:1-05.
42. See W. MURPHY, J. Fl.EM['o!G & W. HARRIS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 185-284 (1986).
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central concern through a collage of snapshot portrayals of nonjudicial
interpretation.
This technique, however, does not detail fully the complexity and
pervasiveness of these dialogues. Volleys between the elected branches
and the courts cannot be summarized neatly in two or three pages, for
such exchanges often take place in many phases. For example, on the
issue of tax exemptions for discriminatory private schools, the three
branches exchanged legislation, judicial opinions, and administrative
proposals for four successive years. 43 The state, executive, and legislative
responses to Roe v. Wade are even more striking. Congress has repeatedly tackled the abortion issue. On the one hand, it has rejected efforts
to defme life at conception44 and to curtail federal court jurisdiction in
this area. 45 On the other hand, it has accepted restrictions on federal
abortion funding4 6 and has funded pro-life counseling programs. 47 The
executive branch likewise has been extremely active in its attempts to
regulate abortion. It has participated in numerous lawsuits in this area48
'
and has made Planned Parenthood and other abortion-related
activities
49
the frequent subject of regulation.
Finally, a vigorous dialogue has
emerged between state legislatures and the federal courts. The legislatures constantly enact, review, and modify laws governing such areas as
pre-abortion counseling, waiting periods, and juvenile and spousal
43. See Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitations Riders, 1987 DUKE
L.J. 456, 488-99. This controversy centered on statutory-not constitutional-interpretation. Yet
the dynamic interplay between all three branches is at least as significant in the statutory context as
it is with constitutional issues. Indeed, Fisher's thesis would apply with equal force to a study of
statutory interpretation. Fisher recognizes this phenomenon. Pp. 206-09. For a provocative exploration into whether public attitudes should shape statutory construction, see Eskridge, Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987).
44. See The Human Life Bill: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117-24 (1981) (text and revised text of bill (S. 158) to
define human life as beginning at conception).
45. H.R. 80, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1985).
46. See Devins, supra note 43, at 466-68, 485-87.
47. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2566-67 (1988) (upholding constitutionality of
statute that provided grants to religious and other institutions that furnished counseling on adolescent premarital sexual relations and did not promote abortion).
48. See, e.g., American College of Obstetricians v. Thornburgh, 473 U.S. 931, 931 (1985)
(mem.) (denying Acting Solicitor General's motion for leave to participate in oral argument with
respect to the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute regnlating abortions); Reproductive Health
Servs. v. Freeman, 614 F.2d 585, 596 n.21 (8th Cir. 1980) (noting that Department of Health, Education and Welfare's amicus brief before district court cited United States Attorney General opinion
letter stating that abortion was not recognized medical treatment, pursuant to the Hyde Amendment, for victims of rape or incest).
49. See, e.g., 53 Fed. Reg. 2944 (1988) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(9)(1)) (providing that
family planning projects receiving certain federal funds cannot provide abortion referrals or "provide
counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning").
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rights. 5° Full-blown case studies would have provided the best look at
these constitutional dialogues.
Furthermore, an assessment of nonjudicial interpretation also would
have improved Constitutional Dialogues. Fisher tells us that "if we count
the times that Congress has been 'wrong' about the Constitution and
compare those lapses with the occasions when the Court has been
'wrong' by its own later admissions, the results make a compelling case
for legislative confidence and judicial modesty."51 Aside from noting one
occasion on which Congress responded more quickly to ill-considered
legislation than the Court responded to an ill-considered decision, 52
Fisher provides little authority to back up this claim. Moreover, Fisher
offers neither assessment nor review of the quality of state and executive
interpretations.
This omission is unfortunate. Once convinced that Fisher's depiction of three-branch interpretation is accurate, the reader hungers for
both some qualitatiye analysis and a prognosis for the future. In light of
widespread doubts over nonjudicial competence, the need for such an
assessment is acute. Recent articles by Judge Abner Mikva and Dean
Paul Brest have contended that legislative debate "does not explore the
constitutional implications of pending legislation; and, at best, Congress
does an uneven job of considering the constitutionality of the statutes it
adopts." 53 Mere assertions. of legislative competence do not adequately
dispel these concerns.
· The inclusion of an extended case study and an assessment of nonjudicial interpretation would have improved this fme book. These omissions, moreover, are surprising. Fisher's recent scholarship (portions of
which he incorporates into the book) includes both a case study of legislative-judicial dialogues on the fourth amendment54 and a positive assessment of constitutional interpretation by Congress. 55
IV.

The Supreme Court'8 Promotion of Three-Branch Interpretation

The role played by nonjudicial interpretations in the shaping of constitutional law tells only part of the story. Constitutional Dialogues also
50. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 15-10 (2d ed. 1988) (surveying governmental regulation of a person's decision about procreation).
51. P. 274.
52. P. 274.
53. Mikva, supra note 37, at 587; see also Brest, supra note 37, at 82-101 (concluding that
Congress has no tradition of constitutional deliberation and no procedures for routinely reviewing
the constitutionality of legislation).
54. Fisher, Congress and the Fourth Amendment, 21 GA. L. REv. 107 (1986).
55. Fisher, supra note 37. This article considers both institutional competence and actual performance. See id. at 717-43.
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acknowledges that Supreme Court rulings play a fundamental role in
three-branch interpretation. Fisher's text reflects the importance of the
Supreme Court's role in sections concerning fourth and fifth amendment
rights, threshold requirements, Younger abstention, and Congress's
power to enforce the reconstruction amendments. In each of these areas,
Fisher shows that the Court polices itself when deciding issues of concern
to the elected branches and the states. For the most part, these analyses
do not implicate substantive doctrine. Fisher focuses instead on jurisdictional authority. 56
One could extend this analysis, for these concerns pervade all constitutional decision making. Judicial review, threshold requirements, commerce, separation of powers, due process, and equality all fundamentally
concern the existence and scope of federal judicial authority as it relates
to the prerogatives of the elected branches and the states.
Consider the equality guarantee. Traditional equal protection review of social and economic legislation presumes legislative supremacy.
Williams v. Lee Optical Co. 57 and Railway Express Agency v. New York 58
reveal the Court's willingness to impute legitimating rationales to seemingly arbitrary classifications. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. 59
and United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz 60 emphasize that
the Court will overlook incorrect legislative fact-finding and suspect legislative purposes provided the legislature's stated rationale is legitimate.
Discussion of these cases raises-in Judge Posner's words-the question
of whether "[t]he real 'justification' for most legislation is simply that it
is the product of the constitutionally created political process of our
society." 61
Heightened-scrutiny equal protection review raises similar concerns.
New York Transit Authority v. Beazer 62 and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
56. Congressional enforcement of the Civil War amendments and fourth and fifth amendment
rights are substantive concerns. Fisher's treatment of these matters, however, emphasizes procedural aspects. With respect to civil rights enforcement, Fisher's principle concern is the Supreme
Court's recognition that "[f]actfmding [in this area] was a legislative, not a judicial responsibility."
P. 270. On fourth and fifth amendment matters, Fisher seeks to demonstrate the truth of Henry
Monaghan's assertion that "what appears to be constitutional interpretation by the courts is sometimes 'a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and
authority from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions; in short, a constitutional common law subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress.' " P. 269 (quoting
Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1975)).
57. 348 u.s. 483 (1955).
58. 336 u.s. 106 (1949).
59. 449 u.s. 456 (1981).
60. 449 u.s. 166 (1980).
61. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial
Minorities, 1974 SUP. Cr. REv. 1, 29.
62. 440 u.s. 568 (1978).
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Living Center 63 show the Court's reluctance over the past decade to extend the list of suspect classifications. An underlying concern of these
decisions-especially in light of the Court's willingness to contort rational basis review in egregious cases64-is the preservation of legislative
prerogatives. The Court's ':reatment of racial and sexual discrimination
allegations, to which heightened scrutiny applies, is equally striking. The
predominant discriminatory motive requirement65 and the difficulty of
making such a showing66 reveal a strong preference for upholding legislative judgments.
Finally, the power of Congress and the states to remedy discrimination shows the Court's desire to validate legislative action. Cases interpreting section 5 of the fourteenth amendment consider Congress's
power and capacity supreme. As the Court stated in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 67 "It is fundamental that in no organ of government, state or federal, does there repose a more comprehensive remedial power than in
Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with competence and
authority to enforce equal. protection guarantees." Affirmative action
cases such as Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 68 recognize that the
state may voluntarily remedy discrimination without garnering evidence
comparable to that which a court would need to order race-conscious
action.
Equality jurisprudence reveals how substantive doctrine can further
an understanding of the :role played by the elected branches and the
states in constitutional doctrine. Greater recognition of the concerns underlying the Court's support of legislative preferences would have
strengthened Fisher's arguments. At the same time, Fisher's basic criticism remains true. The role played by other parts of government in constitutional interpretation cannot be understood solely through case law.
63. 473 u.s. 432 (1985).
64. In Cleburne Living Center, for example, the Court, after holding that the mentally retarded
are not a suspect class, closely scrutinized a zoning ordinance that adversely affected the mentally
retarded. See id. at 455-68 (Marshall, J., concurring) (demonstrating the Court's misapplication of
the rational basis standard).
65. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976) (upholding police screening test
under equal protection challenge b1:cause of employer's lack of intent to discriminate despite test's
disproportionate racial impact).
66. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1763-70 (1987) (rejecting petitioner's argument
that study showing black defendants sentenced to death with greater frequency than white defendants proved discriminatory motive); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeny, 442 U.S. 256,257-80 (1979) (holding
that state hiring preference for vet·~rans was not intentionally discriminatory against women even
though 98% of veterans were men).
67. 448 u.s. 448, 483 (1980).
68. 476 U.S. 267, 284-94 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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V.

Conclusion

Constitutional Dialogues makes a convincing argument for the inclusion of non-case materials in the basic constitutional law class. Nonjudicial interpretation and influence on interpretation are simply too
important to be excluded. Constitutional law casebooks, however, pay
scant attention to three-branch interpretation. 69 Bemoaning this shortsightedness, Fisher argues that "'there is no comprehensive course on
constitutional law in any meaningful sense in American law schools.' " 70
Fisher is quite correct that "[a] purely technical approach to the law
misses the constant, creative interplay between the judiciary and the
political system." 71 Limiting a course to a handful of substantive areas
such as judicial review, separation of powers, equality, and speech does
not permit a systematic study of the workings of the Court as an institution. Although a professor can combat this limitation by considering
either a decision's social context or the relationship between doctrinal
inconsistencies arid social realities, one can extend a course only so far
beyond case moorings.
More significantly, Fisher perceives that law professors' geocentric
understandings of the Constitution will yield an inaccurate portrayal of
constitutional decision making. Although law professors might do a better job than Fisher suspects, the case method does not promote Fisher's
view of three-branch interpretation.
Professors should not limit courses in constitutional law and other
subjects to cases and related doctrinal commentary. Other disciplines
can contribute substantially to legal education. As Douglas Laycock recently observed, "if history, political theory, economics, literary criticism, or Mayan glyphs are important to a course, we need not be limited
to the information we can tuck into notes on the cases." 72 For Laycock,
replacing substantial case materials with expository text on related subjects would accommodate this concern. 73 This methodology would enable students to study both cases and related activities of the elected
branches. Granted, doctrinal headings would still defme the exploration,
but such an approach would allay Fisher's basic concerns. Whether this
approach would work well in law students' first year, when the develop69. See p. 4 n.3.
70. P. 4 (quoting Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of
International Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 8 n.l3 (1984)). See generally pp. 3-6.

71. P. 4.
72. Laycock, Reflections on Two Themes: Teaching Religious Liberty and Evolutionary
Changes in Casebooks (Book Review), 101 HARV. L. REv. 1642, 1654 (1988) (reviewing J. NooNAN,
THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE (1987)).

73. /d. at 1654-55.
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ment of case-analysis skills is crucial, is another question. Yet legal educators can and should take some steps in this direction. 74
The simple truth, as Fisher puts it, is that "[c]ourt decisions are
entitled to respect, not adoration." 75 Constitutional Dialogues' forthright
presentation of nonjudicial influences and interpretations lays an excellent groundwork for expanding our understanding of constitutional interpretations. It is an excellent primer for those involved in
constitutional dialogues-namely, everyone.
74. At the least, professors can use selections from works such as Constitutional Dialogues to
supplement the judicial authority unit of the basic constitutional law class. I have done this, and-as
best I can tell-my students appreciate Fisher's broadening perspective.
75. P. 279.
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What Appeals to the Court
FEDERAL APPEALS: JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE. By Michael E.
Tigar.t Colorado Springs: Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1987.
Pp. xvii, 436. $85.00.t
Reviewed by Alvin B. Rubin*
Moot court judges grade advocates. Court of appeals judges decide
cases. The difference is vast. As Lawrence M. Friedman wrote, "There
are many brilliant lawyers who argue magnificently in front of the
Supreme Court. They mostly lose. The Justices are stubborn and
intelligent." 1
Experienced judges and lawyers know, however, that the skill of an
advocate sometimes does determine a decision. In order to have even a
chance to influence a court, an advocate must first follow the rules of
appellate jurisdiction and practice. Only then can forensic skill play its
part. The utility of a book by an experienced appellate advocate that not
only details the procedure to be followed but also instructs on effective
presentation is therefore obvious.
Many lawyers view appellate advocacy as their clients do. When
preparing a brief, belying its name, they write a lengthy exegesis, finally
abridging it to meet the fifty-page maximum limit Their oral argument
is courtroom oratory better adapted to the ears of a jury. Professor
Michael Tigar instructs just as Piero Calamandrei observes in his Eulogy
of Judges:
What constitutes a great lawyer? He is a man who helps the judge
reach a just decision and helps his client present his case.
Such a lawyer speaks no more than is necessary; he writes
clearly and to the point; he does not encumber the courtroom with
his personality. He does not bore the judges with his prolixity nor
raise their suspicions with his subtlety. For all practical purposes,
then, he is the opposite of that type whom many laymen consider
the great lawyer.2
t Thomas Watt Gregory Professor in Law & Joseph D. Jamail Centennial Chair in Law, The
University of Texas School of Law.
t Hereinafter cited by page, section, or chapter number only.
• Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
I. Friedman, Justices in Black and White, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1984, § 7 (Book Review Section), at 18, col. 1 (reviewing L. BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER: A DUAL BIOGRAPHY
(1984)).
2. P. CALAMANDREI, EULOGY OF JUDGES 59 (J. Adams & C. Phillips trans. 1942).
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Tigar gained most of his appellate experience before becoming a fulltime law professor, but he has continued to brief and argue cases during
his teaching career. In most of his cases, a federal court appoints him to
serve as counsel pro bono. Tigar uses some of these cases as grist for a
seminar on federal appellate advocacy, and his law students assist in preparing the cases. He takes on other cases as retained counsel. Federal
Appeals: Jurisdiction and Practice is a distillation of what Tigar has
learned in two decades of appellate advocacy. ·
Other lawyers have treated us in recent years to a spate of similar
volumes. 3 Professor Tigar's contribution is not only the latest but also
one of the most useful for the: lawyer who takes or defends an appeal in a
federal court of appeals.
Although the opening chapter of Tigar's book deals with "The Art,
Science, and Tactics of Appellate Advocacy," he devotes most of the remaining text to reviewing appellate court rules and providing how-to-doit instruction. He discusses with accuracy and clarity appealable orders,
extraordinary writs, where to appeal, whether to take an appeal, and proceedings in district court, tax court, and before agencies. 4 Tigar then
reviews the handling of the record in the court of appeals, motion practice, the various briefs, oral argument, the courts' decisional process, and
finally, rehearings. 5
Much of this discussion is elementary but, like other fundamentals,
indispensable. Specialists in appellate advocacy are rare. Of the relatively few lawyers who ever appear in a federal appeals court, only a
small percentage handle even one appellate case a year. A very few, most
of them assistant U.S. attorneys, appear more frequently. No one can be
expert in the details of some:thing done only occasionally. A guidebook
is therefore invaluable not only to the beginner, but also to those with
limited appellate experience.
Tigar's chapter on writing briefs includes hints about organizing its
text, using a notebook to assemble material ("the notebook theory," as he
calls it), and using a word processor. 6 These suggestions are useful, for
they are practical. The ultimate test, however, is the quality of the prod3. E.g., M. FONTHAM, WRITTEN AND ORAL ADVOCACY (1985); J. GAUBATZ, THE MOOT
COURT BOOK (1979); R. GiVENS, ADVOCACY: THE ART OF PLEADING A CAUSE (2d ed. 1980); A.
HORNSTEIN, APPELLATE ADVOCACY IN A NUTSHELL (1984); R. LYNN, APPELLATE LITIGATION
(1985); R. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (1987);
R. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE APPEALS (1983); E. RE,
BRIEF WRITING AND ORAL ARGUMENT (6th ed. 1987); R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES (1981); F. WEINER, BRIEFING AND ARGUING FEDERAL APPEALS (1967).
4. Chs. 2-6.
5. Chs. 7-11.
6. Ch. 9.
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uct in a lawyer's attempt to fashion an argument that will lead a court to
the result the advocate seeks.
Tigar writes, "[A]n appellate brief is often a win or lose document." 7
It therefore may seem to some readers that Tigar stresses the brief too
much. Not so. The importance of an effective, well-prepared brief cannot be overemphasized. As Tigar notes, judges read the briefs before
they hear counsel; 8 indeed, almost every federal appellate judge does so
conscientiously, for a judge's lack of preparation quickly becomes evident
to the other members of a panel, if not to counsel. Those few judges who
have not turned the pages of the briefs will have bench memos from law
clerks, who will have read them. It is inevitable, therefore, that prior to
oral argument the judges will have formed some impression about the
merits of the appeal and the cogency of the arguments, even though most
judges maintain open minds on the fmal result. Furthermore, a few days
or months after oral argument, when judges begin to prepare opinions,
most turn once again to the briefs. As Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote:
Regardless of the panel you get, the questions you get, or the answers you give, I maintain it is the brief that does the final job, if
for no other reason than that opinions are often written several
weeks and sometimes months after argument. The arguments,
great as they may have been, are forgotten. In the seclusion of his
chambers the judge has only the briefs and the law books. At that
time your brief is your only spokesman.9
Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure10 requires a
lawyer to begin his brief with a table of contents followed by a statement
of the issues presented for review. The latter should give the court a
clear and self-explanatory resume of the issues raised on appeal. Instead,
as Tigar notes, "[fjar too many brief writers fall into one of two errors:
(1) they reproduce the headings from the body of the brief; or (2) they
state the issue in terms so general as to be useless." 11 Others make a
third and equally common error: they state the issue so narrowly that its
meaning is obscure to anyone who is not already familiar with the case. I
therefore have often read an appellant's statement of the issues without
having any clear idea of what the real issues are or how they arose. A
statement of issues should tell the court exactly what the appeal is about.
The question "Did the trial court err in holding that the 180-day period
for filing a title VII suit is not subject to waiver or estoppel?" tells me
7. P. 224.
8. Pp. 224-25.
9. Marshall, The Federal Appeal, in COUNSEL ON APPEAL 139, 146 (A. Charpentier ed. 1968).
10. FED. R. APP. P. 28; see also sec. 9.08 (arguing that advocates should write very specific
statements of issues presented).
11. P. 239.

227
HeinOnline -- 67 Tex. L. Rev. 227 1988-1989

Texas Law Review

Vol. 67:225, 1988

exactly what the issue is. "Did the trial court err in its instruction on the
elements of the crime of m;ing the mails to defraud?" does not. The latter question does not tell me what the court charged or why that charge
allegedly was deficient.
Next comes a "statement of the case," including a "statement of the
facts relevant to the issues presented for review." 12 As my late colleague
Albert Tate, Jr. once wrote·, "The statement of facts is regarded by many
advocates and judges as the most important part of the brief." 13 Tigar
correctly notes that the statement of the case is the "most difficult part of
the brief to craft," 14 and, in my experience, the statement of facts is also
the weakest part of most briefs. The factual account should be narrative
and in chronological order, with ample citations to the parts of the record that support the accotmt. As Tigar notes, ''The statement must be
coherent, in the sense that the narrative flows from beginning to end." 15
He further emphasizes that "the advocate must seek the thematic unity
and clarity that characterize a good opening statement. " 16 It must be
"both accurate and filled with helpful citations to the record!' 17 With all
of this I agree, and add that the statement of facts should distinguish
clearly what is undisputed from what is contradicted. It should not be a
partisan view of what the evidence might mean if construed wholly favorably in every respect to the counsel's position.
The good advocate will ask a nonlawyer spouse or friend to read not
only the statement of issm!S and the statement of the case but also the
entire brief to see if it is cle:ar and comprehensible. If an intelligent nonlawyer does not understand the issues, a sentence in the brief, or the
significance of an argument, a judge likewise may fail to comprehend.
In di~cussing brief writing and the preparation of an appendix or
record excerpts, Tigar state:s that before oral argument, the full record is
"available to the judges and their law clerks. Few judges take the time to
read it, and most do not c::ven have their law clerks do so . . . . " 18 I
emphasize that judges and law clerks rarely take the time to read the
record before oral argument. The record is filed in the clerk of court's
office. After argument, as Tigar points out, the opinion is assigned to a
judge. The clerk of court s·;:nds the record to that judge's chambers. Af12.
13.
11, 14.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(3).
Tate, The Art of Brief Writing: What a Judge Wants to Hear, LITIGATION, Winter 1978, at

P. 242.
P. 243.
P. 244.
P. 245.
Pp. 24546.
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ter the judge prepares a proposed opinion, the other panel members usually read only that opinion. If they agree with the proposed opinion, they
concur. A panel member will ordinarily ask the writing judge to send the
record to her chambers only if, after reading the draft, she has a different
view of what the record may contain and how the case should be decided.
The moral, of course, is that the briefs and record summary must tell the
judges all that counsel wishes them to know before they hear oral argument and before they reach at least a tentative decision.
Tigar's discussion of the next step, preparing for oral argument, 19 is
particularly helpful. Although he states that "the final step [in preparation] is to practice the argument," 20 I would stress further that rehearsal
is indispensable and ought to be universal. The best rehearsal is before a
panel of three lawyers who have read the briefs and who can serve as a
moot court. John P. Frank, a distinguished advocate,2 1 once told me
that his firm presents no case to any appellate court, state or federal,
until it has been thus argued in the office. "Is that time donated?" I
asked. "Of course not," he answered. "It's billed to the client. That's
just as important as time spent writing the brief." "What," I inquired,
"about pro bono cases?" He replied, "We do the same thing, because it's
an integral part of any preparation."
The lawyer who does not have three fellow lawyers who will participate will find it almost as valuable to argue before a spouse or a friend. It
is useful in either event to record the practice argument with a videocamera and review it.
Although Tigar apparently intended his work to be a basic guide
rather than a commentary, I would have welcomed a broader examination of the federal appellate process containing more analysis, commentary, and criticism. The rules about what constitutes an appealable order
create a continuing problem, and uncertainty about when a litigant may
take an appeal causes repeated litigation and unnecessary expense. 22 The
rule about the time within which a party must file an appeal is apparently
clear, but it may create a trap for counsel. 23 I would welcome sugges19. Ch. 10.
20. P. 272.
21. Mr. Frank served as a law clerk to Justice Hugo Black and taught at Yale Law School. For
more than 30 years, he has practiced in Phoenix, Arizona, as a partner in a major law firm. He is a
member of the Council of the American Law Institute and has been active in the American Bar
Association.
22. See, e.g., Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 108 S. Ct. 1945, 1952 (1988) (holding that claims of
immunity and forum n9n conveniens are not immediately appealable).
23. See, e.g., Alcorn Elec. Exch., Inc. v. Burgess, 849 F.2d 964, 966 (5th Cir. 1988) (involving
counsel who filed notice of appeal before a final issue was resolved and failed to file further notice);
Harcon Barge, Inc. v. D & G Boat Rentals, 784 F.2d 665, 667 (5th Cir. 1986) (en bane) (involving
counsel who failed to file further notice of appeal after opposing party moved to amend judgment).
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tions for changes in the statutes, rules, and decisions on these and other
problematic subjects.
A supplement, containing citations to later decisions and amplifying
comments in the book, is already being prepared. Even in the matter of
appellate procedure, developments come apace. The careful advocate
will not only read the supplement but will continue research to discover
even later decisions.
I have mentioned some areas in which Tigar's excellent book might
have been even better. My final measure of it, however, is this: I wish
that every lawyer who ever expects to participate in an appeal to the
Fifth Circuit would read a copy and then, when the time comes to prepare for an appeal, would reread it and use it as a guide. The lawyer
would benefit by reducing the possibility of harmful error or embarrassment and by enhancing hi8 chances of success. And we judges also
would benefit, for the better the advocates, the easier the judges' task and
the better the resulting opinion. Good advocates help judges to make
better decisions.
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